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It is my goal to lay the conceptual foundation for the epistemology of identity: to begin
the investigation of how it is we come to know, justifiably infer, or reasonably believe that
one thing is identical to another. My conclusion is a restricted form of skepticism; the only
knowable identity claims are trivial.1 While I know that Hesperus is identical to Hesperus,
that Aristotle is identical to Aristotle and that the property of being water is identical to
the property of being water, I do not know that Hesperus is identical to Phosphorus, that
Aristotle is identical to the pupil of Plato and the teacher of Alexander the Great, or that
the property of being water is identical to the property of being the chemical compound H2O.
This paper is largely unconcerned with the metaphysics of identity. From the perspective
of the world, as it were, substantive identity may well proliferate. But, if it does, it lies
beyond our epistemic reach—a tantalizing relation that remains stubbornly and inexorably
inaccessible.
I deny knowledge of substantive identity primarily because I do not see how it could
arise. Initially plausible accounts face insurmountable obstacles. So, this paper is struc-
tured as a response to proposals. I discuss the possibility that our knowledge of identity
is grounded in the identity of indiscernibles, spatiotemporal coincidence, the satisfaction
of identity conditions, direct perception, and extant theories of evidence. These views fall
into one of two camps: those that give rise to skepticism and those that are incorrect.
Yet hope remains. While the proposals I discuss to not yield knowledge of identity, they
are inexhaustive. While I maintain that they are the initially plausible accounts, perhaps
an initially implausible one will succeed while rivals have failed. And so, in some ways,
this paper is as much a call to action as it is a philosophical argument. Although I see no
resolution to the puzzle I raise, I deeply hope that one exists. Our epistemic lives would
be bereft without knowledge of substantive identity.
Before considering candidate accounts, I offer a brief note on the distinction between
trivial and substantive identity. Given that I allow for knowledge of trivial identity (but
deny knowledge of substantive identity) this is an important distinction. It is tempting to
suggest that a trivial identity claim is any that takes the form ‘a = a’—i.e., any in which
1Some terminological clarification: by an ‘identity claim’ I mean a sentence (or perhaps a proposition)
of the form ‘a “ b’ where both a and b are singular terms. The examples I use primarily involve cases
when a and b are proper names, but I am also concerned with sentences of the form ‘a “ The F ’ and ‘The
F is the G,’ so definite descriptions figure centrally as well. And while I primarily discuss identity claims
involving objects, I am also concerned with the identity of properties, propositions and relations.
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the terms flanking the identity sign are themselves identical. However, for the purposes of
this paper an epistemic, rather than a linguistic, characterization is preferable.
Identity is that relation everything stands in to itself and to nothing else. Knowing,
as we do, the meaning of ‘identity,’ we conclude that Socrates is identical to Socrates,
that the United States is identical to the United States, and that the property of being
hydrogen is identical to the property of being hydrogen. That is to say, we sometimes obtain
knowledge of identity by performing universal instantiation on the claim that everything
is self-identical. A trivial identity claim is any that can be known via this method—simply
through universal instantiation. A substantive identity claim, in contrast, is any that is not
trivial. Hopefully, the presence of substantive identity claims is uncontroversial. However it
is that chemists conclude that the property of being salt is identical to the property of being
sodium chloride, it is not merely by appeal to universal instantiation. But if appealing to
the meaning of ‘identity’ is not sufficient, what is? Under what conditions does someone
know that one thing is identical to another?
The Identity of Indiscernibles and Inference from Identity
Claims
An agent S knows that a = b just in case S believes that a = b on the basis of
knowing that a is indiscernible from b.
Perhaps the epistemology of identity can be accounted for by the identity of indiscernibles.
Roughly, the thought is this: we epistemic agents regularly investigate the properties of
things. We employ various empirical methods and inferential resources to uncover objects’
sizes, shapes, colors, masses, etc.. Sometimes, these methods reveal that objects have every
property in common. An object a bears property F if and only if object b bears property
F . If, in this case, an agent were to conclude that object a is identical to object b, she
would do so justifiably (or, perhaps, the inference from ‘a and b share every property’ to
‘a “ b’ preserves knowledge).
For example, a classicist might know through expert testimony that both Cicero and
Tully were both famous Roman orators; she might know through original documents that
both Cicero and Tully were born in the year 106 B.C.E.; she might know through history
textbooks that Cicero and Tully were both sworn enemies of Mark Antony. Eventually,
after a sustained investigation, she might conclude that Cicero and Tully have everything
in common—that there is no property one has that the other lacks. On this basis, she
might reasonably believe that Cicero is identical to Tully: the two men are one and the
same.
This rough picture could be supplemented in various ways. Minimally, we need an
account of how it is agents could know that objects bear all of the same properties. Humans
have finite limitations, and have never determined all of the properties that something
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bears. For example, our classicist friend is presumably unable to independently verify if
both Cicero and Tully had an even number of hairs on their heads. Perhaps checking a
wide, but inexhaustive, range of properties suffices, perhaps the best explanation of the
fact that two objects share a great many properties is that they are identical, or perhaps
some other story could be told. Further, some restriction must be placed on the kinds of
properties that need be checked. If, in order to conclude that a “ b one must first verify
that both a and b bear the property being identical to a, then in order to conclude that a
and b are identical, one must first verify that they are identical. But however the account
is to be augmented, the underlying thought remains the same: knowledge of identity arises
from the identity of indiscernibles.
There is something appealing about this view. The identity of indiscernibles (and its
converse) seem central to our conception of identity. It is no accident that identical objects
bear all of the same properties. If someone were to conclude that objects a and b are
distinct upon learning that their properties differ, they would do so justifiably. And so it
is natural to suggest that if someone were to conclude that a and b aren’t distinct upon
learning that their properties don’t differ, they would do so justifiably as well.
I suspect that astute philosophers already have objections in mind. In particular,
this view faces a worry about Black (1952)-type worlds. Suppose there were a world
consisting only of two perfectly homogeneous spheres. By stipulation, these spheres have
every property in common—they are precisely the same size, shape, color, mass, etc.. Often,
this world is presented as a challenge to the identity of indiscernibles as a metaphysical
view: i.e., as a counterexample to the claim that objects are identical just in case they bear
all of the same properties. Surely, some argue, this situation is metaphysically possible.
There is no conceptual challenge to imagining two qualitatively identical spheres. But if all
qualitatively identical objects are numerically identical, then there would be one sphere,
rather than two.2 This case problematizes not only the metaphysical version of the identity
of indiscernibles, but the epistemic version as well.
Suppose someone were to observe such a world. Armed with acute attention and
unparalleled perceptive powers, she recognized that the two spheres have every property
in common. She realized that they are the same size, are equally massive, have the same
material constitution, etc.. And let us suppose that, after coming to know that the two
spheres are perfect qualitative duplicates, she concluded that they are identical to one
another. According to the epistemic view under consideration, she would thereby come to
know that the spheres are identical. After all, she concluded that they are identical on
the basis of knowing that they are indiscernible from one another. But this is false—the
two spheres aren’t identical. There are two spheres—not one, and our imagined observer
cannot know that distinct spheres are identical. This puzzle does not arise merely because
knowledge is factive; her inference is presumably unjustified. She can plainly see two
2For such discussions, see, e.g., Hacking (1975); Adams (1976); Hawley (2009). For defenses of the
identity of indiscernibles, see e.g., Della Rocca (2005).
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spheres before her very eyes, so how could her belief that they are one be justifiable?
This is a problem, but a potentially surmountable one. Some might maintain that a
world consisting of qualitatively identical spheres is metaphysically impossible, and there-
fore irrelevant to the epistemology of identity. Even if it is metaphysically possible, further
conditions could be added to correct for these kinds of cases. Perhaps we could add a
‘no-defeaters’ clause; if someone knows that a and b bear all of the same properties, the
inference to the claim that they are identical generates knowledge as long as they lack
epistemic defeaters. Because our imagined observer clearly sees two spheres, she has an
epistemic defeater. Or, perhaps, we could introduce a condition involving spatiotemporal
overlap. In order to justifiably conclude that a “ b, one must not only discover that a
and b share every property, but also that a and b perfectly overlap throughout space-time.
Because our imagined observer knows perfectly well that the qualitatively identical spheres
occupy different regions of space, her inference that they are identical does not generate
knowledge.3
But although alterations may accommodate qualitatively identical situations, a deeper
and more intractable problem lurks beneath the surface. Drawing out this problem is no
simple matter, so I temporarily turn to an alternate (if rather silly) account that exhibits
it more transparently.
Suppose that the transitivity of identity accounts for its epistemology: an agent S
knows that a “ b just in case she concludes that a “ b on the basis of knowing that a “ c
and b “ c. In order to know that Superman is identical to Clark Kent, Lois Lane must
conclude that they are identical on the basis of knowing that there is some person c such
that Superman is identical to person c and Clark Kent is identical to person c, and in order
to know that Hesperus is identical to Phosphorus, an astronomer must conclude that they
are identical on the basis of knowing that there is some planet p such that Hesperus is
identical to p and Phosphorus is identical to p. This proposal isn’t simply the claim that
agents can come to know identity claims by appealing to its transitivity; it is the further
contention that the appeal to transitivity is exhaustive. It is the only way to come to know
of substantive identity.
I doubt many readers find this account appealing, but the important point is this: if
it is true, then the form of skepticism I advance obtains. This is because the transitive
account gives rise to regress. In order to know that a “ b someone must know that there
is a c such that they know that a “ c and that b “ c. But in order to know that a “ c,
someone must know that there is a d such that they know that a “ d and c “ d! And we’re
off to the races—in order to know that one identity obtains someone must know infinitely
many obtain. But because none of us do know infinitely many identity claims, no one
knows any identity claims at all. Skepticism results.
Perhaps this argument preceded too quickly, so let us work through an example in more
detail. Suppose Lois Lane, reflecting on numerous suspicions coincidences, concludes that
3I discuss criteria in terms of overlap in more depth in the following section.
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Superman is identical to Clark Kent. Does she know that Superman is identical to Clark
Kent?4 According to the transitive account, she knows that they are identical just in case
she concludes that they are identical on the basis of knowing that there is someone that
Superman is identical to and that Clark Kent is identical to. For example, if she knew that
Superman is identical to the only alien on Earth and that Clark Kent is identical to the
only alien on Earth, she could appeal to the transitivity of identity in order to know that
Superman is identical to Clark Kent.
Does Lois Lane know that Superman is identical to the only alien on Earth? On the
transitive account, she knows that they are identical just in case she concludes that they
are identical on the basis of knowing that there is someone that Superman is identical to
and that the only alien on Earth is identical to. This process continues without end; each
step of the way, Lois is required to know yet another identity claim. And because this
process continues without end (and because she does not know infinitely many identity
claims) Lois does not know that Superman is identical to Clark Kent. This sort of regress
affects knowledge of every substantive identity claim. And so, if the transitive account is
correct, then no one knows substantive identity claims.
I suspect that many find the transitive account to be implausible—perhaps even ludicrous—
partially for this reason. It engenders a regress that leads to skepticism about identity. It
should be clear, however, that this regress could problematize other accounts. Any view on
which knowledge of any one identity claim requires antecedent knowledge of another will
lead to the very same regress. The only agents in a position to know that identity obtains
would be those who know infinitely many identity claims. Because none of us do know
infinitely many identity claims, these will all be views on which no one knows substantive
identity claims.
I maintain that the identity of indiscernibles account face such a problem. Covertly—
subtlely—it builds in antecedent knowledge of identity. Knowledge of any one identity
claim requires knowledge of another, and so it faces the same regress as the transitive
account.
The starting point for this worry is Quine (1964)’s insight about quantification. He ar-
gued that sentences containing multiple occurrences of a variable within the scope of a quan-
tifier presuppose the notion of identity.5 Consider the difference between ‘DxFx ^ DxGx’
and ‘DxpFx ^ Gxq.’ While the first sentence asserts that something is F and something
(quite possibly something else) is G, the second asserts that the very same thing is both F
4This argument could be framed equally well in terms of justified belief or possessing evidence, so while
I focus on knowledge of identity here, the regress leads to a worry affecting the epistemology of identity
more broadly.
5Others who provide similar arguments include Hawthorne (2003); McGinn (2000). For a recent critical
discussion, see Burgess (2018). I will largely not engage with Burgess’s argument, because his target differs
from my own. He is primarily concerned with whether the concept of quantification involves the concept
of identity (i.e., do invocations of the concept of quantifiers containing multiple occurrences of a variable
invoke the concept of identity), while I am concerned with whether evidence of quantification requires
evidence of identity.
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and G; that which is F is identical to that which is G. Or consider the difference between
@xFx Ø @xGx and @xpFx Ø Gxq. The first sentence claims that everything is F if and
only if everything is G; it is compatible with a situation in which an object is not F while
some other object is not G. In contrast, the second asserts that the very same objects
that are F are G; the objects which are F are identical to the objects which are G. As
Hawthorne says, “[w]ithout mastery of the concept of identity, it is not clear how we would
understand the significance of the recurrence of a variable within the scope of a quantifier”
(Hawthorne, 2003, pg. 100). I agree, and maintain that this has epistemic implications.
In particular, someone who does not know that an object which is F is identical to an
object which is G is not in an epistemic position to conclude that ‘DxpFx^Gxq.’ Similarly,
someone who did not know that the objects which are F are identical to the objects which
are G is not in an epistemic position to conclude @xpFxØ Gxq.
Although Quine and Hawthorne address first-order quantification, the point also applies
to higher-order quantifiers. The sentence ‘DF pFa ^ Fbq’ differs from ‘DFFa ^ DFFb’ in
that the first presupposes that the very same property borne by both a and b, while the
second claims only that some property is borne by a while some property (quite possibly
a different property) is borne by b. The epistemic point remains as well; agents who do
not know that the property borne by a is identical to the property borne by b are not in a
position to know that DF pFa^ Fbq. That is to say, the only agents in a position to know
that some property is borne both by a and b are those who know that the property borne
by a is identical to the property borne by b.
The identity of indiscernibles account states that an agent S knows that a “ b just in
case S believes that a “ b on the basis of knowing that a is indiscernible from b—i.e., just in
case S concludes that a “ b on the basis of knowing @F pFaØ Fbq. Notably, this condition
involves a variable that appears multiple times under the scope of a quantifier. In order
to know that it obtains, agents must know that the properties borne by a are identical
to the properties borne by b. Those who do not know that the properties borne by a are
identical to those borne by b are not in an epistemic position to know that @F pFaØ Fbq.
Knowledge of this biconditional is itself necessary for knowing that a “ b (at least on the
present account), and so the only agents who know that a “ b are those who know a further
identity claim; they are those who know that the properties borne by a are identical to
the properties borne by b. And so, knowledge of one identity claim requires knowledge of
others.
The same regress threatening the transitive account also affects the identity of indis-
cernibles. In order to know that a “ b, one must know that the properties borne by a are
the same properties as those borne by b, i.e., agents must know that the properties borne
by these objects are themselves identical. In order to know that the properties borne by
a are identical to the properties borne by b, agents must know that their properties are
identical. We are, once again, off to the races. And because the selection of a “ b was
arbitrary, knowledge of any one identity claim requires knowledge of others. Because no
one knows infinitely many identity claims, no one knows any substantive identity claims
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at all.
I suspect that slight modifications to this view encounter the same obstacle. Even if an
agent need not verify that a and b share every property in common (perhaps just checking
a great many) she must still ensure that the properties she does check that are borne by
a are identical to those properties borne by b. The essential feature of the identity of
indiscernibles is verifying that things bear the same properties; but in verifying that things
bear the same properties, one must verify that the properties are themselves the same.
I do not deny this account—perhaps it is the foundation of the epistemology of identity.
But, if it is, then skepticism reigns.
Spatiotemporal Overlap
An agent S knows that a “ b just in case S believes that a “ b on the basis of
knowing that a and b are spatiotemporally coincident.
How did the ancients discover that Hesperus is Phosphorus? The actual history is probably
quite convoluted; scientists needed to develop an astronomical theory on which the same
object could regularly appear in both the morning and evening sky, and some reason to
predict that the object following Hesperus’s trajectory would appear precisely where Phos-
phorus appears. I am no historian, and do not want to speculate about matters I know
little about. Instead, I offer what is probably a fictionalized story. Astronomers, having
developed the appropriate theory, recognized that Hesperus and Phosphorus occupied pre-
cisely the same region of space. Of course, they were presumably wrong about what this
region of space was; the Babylonians who first realized that Hesperus is Phosphorus did
not know that Venus orbits the sun. But although they were ignorance of what region of
space Hesperus occupies, the knew it to be the same region of space Phosphorus occupies.
Instead of believing that there are two planets that occupy exactly the same region of
space, they concluded that the two planets are one and the same: Hesperus is identical to
Phosphorus.
Perhaps the epistemology of identity can be understood along similar lines. After all,
just as it is no accident that identical objects bear the same properties, so too it is no ac-
cident that identical objects occupy the very same region of space at the same time; Venus
is not identical to an object located in a different place than Venus. Perhaps those who
conclude that objects are identical on the basis of knowing that they are spatiotemporally
coincident thereby come to know that those objects are identical. This view has attractive
features. It easily accommodates the observations of Black-type worlds previously dis-
cussed. If someone were to observe two qualitatively identical spheres and conclude that
they are identical, she would not count as knowing that they are identical. After all, she
can plainly see that the spheres occupy different regions of space.
As with the identity of indiscernibles, refinements are needed. We humans have finite
limitations and can neither check every region of space nor every region of time. But
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however the details are ultimately worked out, the underlying thought is that knowledge
of identity arises from knowledge of spatiotemporal overlap.
Challenging cases quickly arise. Consider that classic example of the statue and the
clay. Many hold that the two are perfectly coincident—the objects occupy the very same
location in space.6 Nevertheless, we can be sure that the objects are distinct because they
bear different properties. Minimally, their dispositional properties differ. A fragile statue
is disposed to break when it is dropped, but a lump of clay would remain. This disposition
might itself be understood in terms of essence. While the statue is essentially shaped thus-
and-so, the clay is only accidentally shaped thus-and-so. So while an alteration of shape
would destroy the statue, it would not destroy the clay out of which the statue is made.
Some discussions also allow for the statue and clay to have varied historically—the clay
existed for some period of time before it was shaped into a statue. If so, the statue and
the clay do not overlap throughout spacetime, they merely overlap through part of it. But
we can consider versions of this case where both the clay and statue come into being and
are destroyed simultaneously, and so vary in their dispositional properties but are always
entirely coincident. Many philosophers thus contend that it is possible for two objects to
occupy the same points throughout all of space-time. But why stop at two? How many
objects are co-located with the statue?
The statue of David is currently located in Florence. It could be moved elsewhere—
it might be displayed in an exhibition in Rome. Neither the statue nor the marble that
compose it would be destroyed by this move; both only accidentally bear the property being
located in Florance. But perhaps there is some other object which is destroyed. Perhaps
something is coincident with David that is only accidentally composed of marble and only
accidentally shaped thus-and-so, but is essentially located in Florence. This sort of object is
destroyed when it is transported to another exhibition, but would not be destroyed if it were
smashed. Of course, people rarely pay attention to this sort of object; it does not impinge
much upon our lives. But some maintain that this reflects something about us, rather
than the world. These philosophers (who are sometimes called ‘unlimited essentialists’)
maintain that for anything that bears some collection of properties, there exists an object
that bears each subset of those properties essentially and the rest accidentally.7 The
primary motivation for unlimited essentialism is the difficulty in constructing a principled
distinction between those properties an object bears essentially and the others accidentally.
What is it in virtue of that David essentially bears its shape but accidentally bears its
location? Without a criterion in hand, it seems that what makes a property essential is an
arbitrary feature of the world. Of course, we need not be unlimited essentialists in order
6Those who defend objectual coincidence (in some form or other) include, but are not limited to Baker
(1997, 2000); Fine (2003); Forbes (1987); Johnston (1992); Koslicki (2004); Kripke (1971); Lowe (1995);
Oderberg (1996); Shoemaker (2003); Thomson (1983, 1998); Yablo (1987). For a defense of a conception of
identity in terms of material constitution see e.g., Noonan (1993).
7For defenses of unlimited essentialism, see Fine (1999); Johnston (2006); Koslicki (2008). For further
discussion of unlimited essentialism, see Dasgupta (2018).
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to maintain that the statue is distinct from the clay; perhaps there are two and only two
objects at that location.
If there are two (or more) coincident objects, then challenges arise for accounts in terms
of spatiotemporal overlap. Suppose someone came to know that the statue of David is co-
located with a particular lump of marble, and concluded, on that basis, that the statue is
identical to the lump. On the present account, such a person would thereby come to know
that the statue is identical to the lump. But, surely, this is false; the statue isn’t identical
to the lump, and so our reasoner cannot know that they are identical.
More mundane cases are also troubling. It is desirable for an epistemology of identity
to account for the identity of both concrete and abstract objects: for it to provide con-
ditions in which an agent knows that the property F is identical to the property G (for
example). Accounts in terms of spatiotemporal overlap are ill-equipped for these kinds of
cases, because abstract objects are not spatiotemporally located at all.
I suspect that modifications could account for these cases. Some philosophers might
deny that the statue is distinct from the clay, and so contend that our imagined reasoner
knows they are identical. Nominalists—who deny the existence of abstract objects—would
presumably not object to accounts that do not provide conditions applicable to them.
I myself was briefly tempted by a hybrid view that incorporated elements from both the
identity of indiscernibles and spatiotemporal overlap in order to accommodate these cases.
I believed that an agent S knows that a “ b just in case she concludes that they are identical
on the basis of both knowing that a and b are indiscernible from one another and that they
are spatiotemporally coincident. This, I thought, accommodated both the possibility of
Black-type worlds and the distinction between the statue and the clay. Additionally, it
might explain why it is our epistemic access between concrete an abstract objects differ.
Abstract objects are not located in space or in time, so the condition of spatiotemporal
coincidence is satisfied vacuously. In order to know that two abstract object objects are
identical, one must merely verify that they bear the same properties. Concrete objects, in
contrast, must also known to be located in the same region of spacetime.
I no longer believe this to be the case. The spatiotemporal coincidence account faces
the very same regress affecting the identity of indiscernibles. In order to know that a is
identical to b, agents must antecedently know that the regions of spacetime they occupy
are the same; i.e., that the regions of space-time they occupy are identical. Therefore,
for an arbitrary identity claim a “ b, knowledge that a “ b requires knowledge of some
other identity claim. Because the selection of a “ b is arbitrary, knowledge of any identity
claim requires knowledge of another. So the only agents in an epistemic position to know
that an identity claim obtains are those who know that infinitely many identity claims.
Because none of us know infinitely many identity claims, no one knows any identity claims
at all.8 As with the identity of indiscernibles, I take no stand on whether accounts in
8Note that this regress holds whether or not this account is supplemented by the identity of indiscernibles.
In the unsupplemented form, the only identity claim that agents need antecedently know in order to know
that a “ b is that the spacetime region occupied by a is identical to the spacetime region occupied by b.
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terms of spatiotemporal overlap are correct; they may well furnish the foundation for the
epistemology of identity. But, if they do, then skepticism reigns.
The Satisfaction of Identity Conditions
An agent S knows that a “ b just in case S believes that a “ b on the basis of
knowing that the identity conditions for a and b are satisfied.
Other examples may serve as better guides. Quite plausibly, I know that {2} is identical
to {the successor of 1}. My knowledge, it seems, arises from my inference from the claim
that the number 2 is identical to the successor of the number 1 and from the identity
conditions of sets: i.e., the fact that sets with identical members are themselves identical.
That is to say, I conclude that the sets are identical on the basis of knowing what the
identity conditions for sets are and knowing that these conditions are satisfied. Perhaps all
knowledge of identity is similar. Perhaps knowledge of identity arises from the knowledge
of identity conditions.
This suggestion engenders skepticism for a far more banal reason than regress; we typi-
cally do not know the identity conditions of things. Set theory is something of an exception;
we know the identity conditions by fiat, simply because we stipulated those conditions when
constructing the theory. Of course, knowledge of identity conditions alone does not itself
furnish the resources for knowing that sets are identical. Knowledge that these conditions
are satisfied is also required. In order to know that {Hesperus} is {Phosphorus}, for exam-
ple, I must know that Hesperus is identical to Phosphorus. And so although I know what
the identity conditions of sets are, I do not know that these conditions are satisfied unless
I know further identity claims.
Other areas pose additional challenges. Take, for example, personal identity over time.
Philosophers have plausibly devoted more attention to the identity conditions of persons
than of anything else. There are a vast number of theories of what it takes for a person at
one time to be identical to another.9 Perhaps an extant view is true; maybe Locke (1690)
is correct that personal identity can be accounted for by memory. But even if Locke is
correct, it is safe to assume that no one knows that Locke is correct. There is sufficient room
for doubt about what personal identity consists of that no one has passed the threshold
of knowledge. And if no one knows the identity conditions of persons, then no one can
come to know that two persons are identical by knowing that the identity conditions are
satisfied. After all, no one knows what these conditions are.10
For the supplemented version, agents need also know that the properties borne by a are identical to the
properties borne by b.
9This literature is so large, and I suspect that most readers are so familiar, that it is probably pointless
to provide references. However, see, e.g., Locke (1690); Hume (1738); Reid (1785); Parfit (1971); Lewis
(1976); Shoemaker (1984); Swinburne (1997).
10Even if we were in a position to know what the identity conditions of persons are, other epistemic
10
In other areas, our ignorance is even more pervasive. We have devoted far less attention
to (and so presumably do not know) the identity conditions for things like tables, planets
or countries. On this account, in order to know that a cup of coffee is identical to the
one I hold in my hand, I must know the identity conditions for a cup of coffee. But I do
not know the identity conditions for a cup of coffee, so I do not know which cups of coffee
are identical to my cup. Quite generally, we do not count as knowing what the identity
conditions of things are. Because this account dictates that knowledge of identity requires
knowledge of identity conditions, if it is true then no one knows substantive identity claims.
And so, if knowledge of identity is grounded in knowledge of the satisfaction of identity
conditions, skepticism reigns.
Knowledge Through Direct Perception
An agent S knows that a “ b just in case S believes that a “ b on the basis of
directly perceiving that a “ b.
Perhaps we have unmediated access to identity.11 That is to say, perhaps we directly
perceive a thing’s identity just as we directly perceive its color, size and shape. The
epistemology of identity can be folded into the epistemology of perception; I know that a
thing is identical to itself because I perceive that it is so.
The details of this suggestion depend upon the epistemology of perception. How do
our perceptual experiences generate knowledge of the external world? Perhaps we draw
conclusions from our sense-data.12 When we perceive a box is red, we possess a mental
object (a sense datum) which is red, and conclude on that basis that the box is red.
Or, perhaps, perceptions have finely-grained content (a perception p might have content
c just in case those who perceive p non-inferentially conclude that c) and perceptions
offer prima facie support for their content.13 And yet another route to the relevant type
of skepticism would be to grant that we perceive identity, but to deny that perceptual
experiences generate knowledge.14 But however the details are worked out, the underlying
challenges would remain. If persons a and b are identical just in case either person a remembers acting
as person b acted or person b remembers acting as person a acted, this account requires knowing what it
is people remember. That is to say, if knowledge of identity arises from knowing that identity conditions
are satisfied, and the identity conditions of persons are determined by their memories, then knowing that
people are identical requires knowing what it is they remember. But, typically, we do not know what people
remember. When I observe someone enter a room I have no idea what they remember and what they forget.
And so even if we knew the identity conditions of persons (which we do not), we would often remain unable
to know that people are identical.
11My thanks to Ralph Wedgwood for this suggestion.
12For defenses of this kind of view, see, e.g., Price (1932); Vogel (1990); Robinson (1994). For critiques,
see, e.g., Berkeley (1710 (2008); Reid (1764 (1997).
13For defenses of this kind of view, see, e.g., McDowell (1994); Brewer (1999). For critiques, see, e.g.,
Byrne (2005); Speaks (2005).
14For discussions along these lines, see Davidson (1986), and, in places, Descartes (1673 (2017).
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thought is that we directly perceive identity and so the epistemology of identity arises form
the epistemology of perception.
I maintain that this is false. To be clear, I grant that we could fold the epistemology
of identity into the epistemology of perception if we perceived identity. What I deny is
that we perceive identity. I am original doubtful because I know of know perceptual
mechanism that would allow us to perceive identity. Through sight, I perceive color;
through hearing, I perceive sound; through touch, I perceive shape. In contrast, I know of
no perceptual mechanism that allows agents to perceive identity. Rather, agents infer (often
unconsciously) that objects are identical on the basis of what they do perceive. However,
my initial doubts are no argument, and this proposal warrants a more substantive reply.
Suppose that I know two identical twins—Bert and Ernie—who are indistinguishable
to me; my perception of one of them is precisely the same as my perception of the other. Of
course, Bert and Ernie have no difficulty in distinguishing themselves ‘from the inside’—
Bert is not confused as to whether or not he is Ernie. But I lack this internal access, and
so I often am unable to tell them apart.
Suppose that I observe one of them enter the room. Because Bert and Ernie are
qualitative duplicates, my phenomenal experience would be the same whether or not the
person is either Bert or Ernie. For the sake of specificity, let us assume that the person
entering the room is Bert—not Ernie. The person who enters the room looks and sounds
precisely as Bert looks and sounds. Of course, he also looks and sounds exactly as Ernie
looks and sounds, for Bert and Ernie look and sound the same. What facts about identity
do I perceive?
There are four possibilities that could obtain:
1. I perceive that the person is identical to Bert and not identical to Ernie.
2. I perceive that the person is identical to Ernie and not identical to Bert.
3. I perceive that the person is both identical to Bert and identical to Ernie.
4. I neither perceive that the person is identical to Bert nor identical to Ernie.
Options 1 and 2 are nonstarters. Bert and Ernie are indistinguishable to me, so my
perception of one of them entering the room is the same as my perception of the other
entering. I lack a perceptual resource that allows me to determine that the person is
identical to Bert and not to Ernie, nor do I have a faulty mechanism which incorrectly
informs me that the person is identical to Ernie and not to Bert. There is nothing in my
perception that allows me to conclude that the person is identical to one rather than the
other.
Option 3 at least avoids the charge of arbitrary perceptions. If either person were to
enter the room, I would perceive that the person is identical both to Bert and identical
to Ernie. But this is where its advantages end. Option 3 entails that my perceptions are
incoherent with what I know to be true. If I perceive both that the person is identical to
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Bert and identical to Ernie, then it follows from my perception entails that Bert is identical
to Ernie. Because I know perfectly well that Bert is not identical to Ernie, my perceptual
experience conflicts with what I know to be true.
But, surely, my perception isn’t inconsistent with what I know to be true. When Bert
walks into the room I do not know whether the person is Bert or Ernie, but I have no
doubt that the person is identical to one of them, rather than both. There is no epistemic
need to re-weigh my evidence and determine whether Bert and Ernie after all. I don’t have
evidence that they are identical. So I do not perceive that the person is both identical to
Bert and identical to Ernie.
What remains is option 4. I neither perceive that the person is identical to Bert nor
identical to Ernie. Because these are the only two people I could reasonably perceive this
person to be identical to, I do not perceive identity. Of course, this case is somewhat
idiosyncratic; not everyone has a phenomenally indistinguishable identical twin. However,
my perceptual experience when Bert enters is presumably not dependent upon whether or
not another phenomenally indistinguishable person exists. That is to say, it is not the case
that whether or not I perceive Bert’s identity depends upon whether or not Ernie exists.
And so I do not directly perceive facts about identity.
I thus deny that we directly perceive identity and, for this reason, also deny that the
epistemology of identity is a species of the epistemology of perception.
Extant Accounts of Knowledge and Evidence
An agent S knows that a “ b just in case S satisfies standard conditions for
knowledge regarding the proposition that a “ b.
There is a suggestion that is boring, unoriginal, and initially plausible: the epistemology of
identity can be straightforwardly folded into existing theories of knowledge, evidence and
justification. There are several reasons to suspect that this is the case. First, it promises
a unified theory of epistemology. We need not adopt a separate account for each type of
proposition; rather a general account determines what agents know quite generally. Second,
this explains why it is no one has bothered to discuss the epistemology of identity. There
is no special problem for identity, the thought goes, we simply need to ‘plug in’ identity
claims to existing theories.
A benefit of this suggestion is that it is easy to test. Accounts of knowledge, evidence
and justification are readily available, so it is straightforward to select from the bevy of
options. I do not canvass every epistemic theory here. This is partially due to restrictions
on space, and partially because some accounts determine little (if anything) about what
the epistemology of identity consists of. According to reliabilist theories of justification, for
example, a belief is justified just in case the process by which it is formed is reliable—i.e.,
it leads to true beliefs sufficiently frequently.15 Absent an understanding of what it is that
15For defenses of this sort of account of justification, see, e.g., Goldman (1979, 1986).
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leads to the belief that one thing is identical to another, this says nothing in particular
about the epistemology of identity. So it is difficult to determine what, precisely, justifies
the inference to identity from this account alone.
Epistemic Possibility
Fortunately, other views are easier to evaluate. One such view relies upon the notion of
epistemic possibility—a kind of modality relating to how the world might be for all that one
knows. Epistemic modality is standardly contrasted with subjunctive modality—a kind
not indexed to agents’ epistemic states. A prominent conception of epistemic modality
concerns our ability to locate oneself within modal space.16 Roughly, the picture is this:
there are a vast number of possible world. In some, Donald Trump is President, while in
others Hillary Clinton is President; in some the United States never entered World War
II, while in others it is currently engaged in World War III; in some intelligent life never
evolved, while in others it is widespread throughout the universe. Presumably, no one has
uniquely identified which possible world is actual, at least in a non-indexical way. While
someone may truly say ‘This world is actual,’ she does not know whether or not she lives
in a world with an even number of blades of grass. Nevertheless, some restrictions are at
hand. I know that I am not in a world entirely devoid of intelligent life, for example, on
the grounds that I exist.
Some maintain that evidence serves to eliminate candidate possible worlds. The more
evidence I have, the narrower the scope of possible worlds that I might occupy. Thus, for
example, Hawthorne (2004) states “It is possible that p for S at t (there is a chance that p
for S at t) iff p is consistent with what S knows at t” (pg. 26. See also Hawthorne (2012)),
and Stanley (2005) claims “It is possibleA that p is true if what A knows does not, in a
manner that is obvious to A, entail not-p” (pg. 128).17
Along these lines, we might say that e is conclusive evidence that p just in case p is
epistemically necessary for all of those in possession of e (i.e., just in case for every agent in
possession of e, all epistemically possible worlds are worlds in which p is true). For example,
my phenomenal experience is conclusive evidence for the existence of intelligent life, because
there is no possible world in which someone possesses my phenomenal experience and
intelligent life does not exist. Inconclusive evidence might be defined in various ways: we
might say that e is inconclusive evidence that p just in case there are more possible worlds
in which both e and p are true than worlds in which e is true and p is false, or perhaps that
all (or most) of the relevantly close worlds in which e is true are also worlds in which p is
also true, or that the counterfactuals ‘If e were true then p would be true’ and ‘If e were
16There are other prominent accounts of epistemic modality. For example, (Hacking, 1967, pg. 153)
defends the view that “‘it is possible that p’ means that p is not easily known to be false, nor would
practicable investigations establish that it is false.” For related views, see, e.g., Teller (1972); DeRose
(1991); MacFarlane (2011).
17For a more formal development of this sort of view, see, e.g., Yalcin (2007).
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false then p would be false’ hold. A newspaper report that Edmund Hillary climbed Mount
Everest is inconclusive evidence that Hillary climbed Everest just in case the number of
possible worlds in which the newspaper report exists and Hillary climbed Everest than
possible worlds in which the report does not exist and Hillary did not climb Everest (or
one of the other candidate theories of inconclusive evidence).
On this view, something constitutes evidence for an identity claim just in case it narrows
which possible worlds we might occupy in the appropriate way. e is conclusive evidence
that a “ b just in case it epistemically necessary for all those in possession of e that
a “ b—i.e., all epistemically possible worlds are worlds in which a “ b (and similarly so
for inconclusive evidence). So, in which possible worlds does a “ b?
Well, all of them or none of them, depending on whether ‘a “ b’ is true. Since at
least the 1970’s the received view has been that identity holds necessarily. If Hesperus is
identical to Phosphorus in the actual world, then Hesperus is identical Phosphorus in every
possible world; there is no possible way for them to be distinct. The necessity of identity
receives support from multiple fronts; Marcus (1947) first offered a proof from modest
modal assumptions, and Kripke (1980) provided additional linguistic support. If this is
correct, then the set of worlds in which a “ b is either the set of all possible worlds (if it
is true) or else the null set (if it is false). On this view, everything constitutes evidence of
(true) identity claims, as it is epistemically necessary for everyone that the identity holds,
regardless of what evidence is at hand. This proposal thus fails the test of extensional
adequacy, for it inaccurately entails that everything whatsoever is conclusive evidence of
identity.
Perhaps some are tempted to appeal to metalinguistic ignorance in this kind of case.18
Although every possible world is one in which Hesperus is Phosphorus, not every world
is one in which ‘Hesperus’ and ‘Phosphorus’ co-refer. Perhaps anything that narrows the
possible worlds to ones in which ‘Hesperus’ and ‘Phosphorus’ denote one and the same
object counts as evidence that Hesperus is Phosphorus.
This suggestion remains extensionally inadequate. Consider, for example, a person
who has no knowledge of what either ‘Hesperus’ or ‘Phosphorus’ refer to—they could
denote planets, people, countries, etc.. Such a person might have it on good authority
that ‘Hesperus’ and ‘Phosphorus’ co-refer—i.e., they might hear expert testimony that the
two names denote the same object, whatever that object is. In this case, the person has
evidence that ‘Hesperus’ refers to the same object as ‘Phosphorus,’ but she lacks evidence
that Hesperus is Phosphorus.
So too, it seems, someone might have evidence that Hesperus is Phosphorus while
lacking evidence that ‘Hesperus’ refers to the same object as ‘Phosphorus.’ Perhaps an
astronomer, ignorant of the Ancient Greek names and out-of-touch with contemporary
philosophy, has no idea whether or not ‘Hesperus’ and ‘Phosphorus’ co-denote. Such
an astronomer could, with the appropriate astronomical evidence and theories, come to
18See, e.g., Frege (1879); Stalnaker (1976) for this sort of appeal.
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know that Hesperus is Phosphorus, without ever hearing either name. This astronomer
has evidence that Hesperus is Phosphorus, but lacks evidence that ‘Hesperus’ denotes the
same object as ‘Phosphorus.’ So it is possible to have evidence that ‘Hesperus’ co-refers
with ‘Phosphorus’ without having evidence that Hesperus is Phosphorus, and it is possible
to have evidence that Hesperus is Phosphorus without having evidence that ‘Hesperus’
co-refers with ‘Phosphorus.’
E=K
Perhaps this trouble is peculiar to this particular account of evidence. Perhaps other theo-
ries are better equipped to accommodate identity. And, perhaps, the ability to incorporate
the epistemology of identity is a mark in favor of alternate views.
To that end, I turn to Williamson (2000)’s recent proposal that evidence is knowledge.
He defends this view while outlining important theoretical roles knowledge can play even
if it is irreducible to anything more fundamental. In arguing that E=K, Williamson claims
that a person’s total evidence is identical to what they know. His argument is the following:
1. All evidence is propositional.
2. All propositional evidence is knowledge.
3. All knowledge is evidence.
4. Therefore, all and only evidence is knowledge.
This argument is incontrovertibly valid, but each of the premises is contentious. Many
prosecutors, for example, would enter a bloody knife as evidence in a murder trial, but a
bloody knife is not a proposition.
Williamson defends these premises in multiple ways. In support of premise 1, for
example, he notes that sentences of the form ‘A because B’ are ungrammatical if the terms
taking the place of A and B were not assertoric expressions; for example, the statement
‘Albania because ... ’ is ungrammatical. If evidence is to be understood as that which
underlies explanatory assertions, it may be that only truth-evaluable entities count as
evidence. In addition, particular evidence is sometimes said to be inconsistent with one
hypothesis or another, and it is unclear how something non-propositional is capable of
being either consistent or inconsistent with anything at all.19
The majority of Williamson’s discussion concerns agents’ total bodies of evidence. An
exhaustive theory of evidence surely requires more. In addition to accounting for the total
evidence someone has available, it ought, minimally, to determine when evidence lends
19The claim that E=K has come under attack on multiple fronts. For example, Brueckner (2005) argues
that Williamson cannot accommodate perceptual knowledge; I may know that a cup is red based on my
perception, but my perception is not a proposition, and Joyce (2004) argues that it cannot accommodate
the fact that the evidential status of many propositions is a matter of degree.
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support to one claim rather than another. According to Williamson, my knowledge that
whales are mammals counts among my evidence, but which propositions does it support
in particular?
To this end, Williamson provides the following account:
EV: e is evidence that h for S if and only if S ’s evidence includes e and P(h|e)
ą P(h).
Whether S’s evidence includes that e is determined by S’s knowledge, and whether or
not it is evidence for a particular proposition h is determined by whether the probability
of h given e is greater than the probability of h without e.
This proposal faces the opposite problem plaguing epistemic possibility accounts. While
they entailed that everything is evidence of identity, Williamson’s proposal entails that
nothing is. On the standard view, identity claims are either necessarily true or necessarily
false. So the probability of any identity claim is either 1 or 0. According to standard
probability theory, it is impossible for any evidence to raise the probability of proposi-
tions whose initial probabilities are either. Nothing raises the probability of claims with a
probability of 1; that it the highest probability anything can possibly have. And nothing
impossible becomes more likely on the basis of new evidence; that which is impossible
remains impossible regardless of what evidence is obtained.
Evidence is defined in terms of knowledge which raises probability, and nothing raises
the probability of identity claims, so nothing is evidence of identity. This account thus fails
the test of extensional adequacy, for I assume that there is evidence of identity or other.
Accounts that entail that there is no evidence of identity (like the proposal that E=K)
misdiagnose the relevant cases.
I have primarily addressed theories of evidence, but similar considerations apply to
modal accounts of knowledge. Nozick (1981), for example, defends an account in terms of
sensitivity; S knows that p just in case S’s belief that p is sensitive to the truth of p—i.e., if
and only if S would not believe that p if p were false.20 This too struggles to accommodate
necessary truths—it is difficult to interpret this condition when it is impossible for p to be
false. Similarly, Sosa (1999) defends an account of knowledge in terms of safety; S knows
that p just in case the S believes that p in the closest possible worlds in which p is true
and S does not believe that p in the closest possible worlds in which p is false.21 This
fairs slightly better than accounts in terms of sensitivity. Minimally, it requires that agents
believe identity claims in the closest possible worlds. Nevertheless, challenges remain.
Agents who stubbornly believe identity claims regardless of evidence count as knowing
identity on safety accounts. After all, if an identity claim holds at all then it holds in every
possible world. So the closest possible worlds in which an identity claim obtains are just
the closest possible worlds. So long as such agents hold fast to their belief in identity, they
20For critiques of sensitivity, see Kripke (2011). For a recent defense, see Ichikawa (2011).
21For critiques of safety see, e.g., Comestan˜a (2005).
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will believe that it obtains in the closest possible worlds in which it obtains. And since
there are no possible worlds in which the identity does not obtain, agents need not worry
about disbelieving identities in the closest worlds in which the identity is false. But, it
seems, steadfastly retaining belief in identity, regardless of the evidence, does not generate
knowledge of identity.
The upshot is that accounts of epistemology which depend upon modal considerations
are plagued by the necessity of identity. It is difficult for these accounts to accommodate
propositions that are either necessarily true or necessarily false. Because identity holds
necessarily (if it holds at all), it is difficult for these kinds of theories to account for the
epistemology of identity. Of course, there are other theories without explicitly modal
content. Whether any these view account for the epistemology of identity and can stave
off skepticism is a subject for later discussion.
Conclusion
At the inception of the analytic tradition, there was a puzzle concerning identity. Philoso-
phers came to realize that some identity claims are substantive while others are trivial.
The claim that Hesperus is Phosphorus requires weighty empirical evidence, while the
claim that Hesperus is Hesperus requires hardly any justification at all. What followed was
a sustained discussion of the meanings of proper names, the development of a novel and
meticulous philosophical methodology and the beginnings of the linguistic turn.
What did not follow was an investigation of the epistemology of identity. To the best of
my knowledge, no papers were published on the conditions for an agent to know that one
thing is identical to another; no conferences were held addressing what it is that justifies
the inference to an identity claim; there were no books on what constitutes evidence of
identity. Today, we remain nearly as ignorant of the epistemology of identity as we have
ever been.
This paper has been an attempt to begin to rectify this historical oversight. I have
canvassed the plausible accounts of the epistemology. Several (the identity of indiscernibles,
spatiotemporal overlap and the satisfaction of identity conditions) give rise to skepticism;
the only knowable identity claims are trivial. Another (direct perception) faces a challenge
concerning observations of qualitative duplicates. And theories of knowledge and evidence
that employ modal notions face challenges arising from the necessity of identity.
We are left in a bleak state. The most plausible candidate theories of the epistemology of
identity generate a skeptical conclusion. If skepticism can be avoided, it is with an account
I do not mention here. While this is the first systematic discussion of the epistemology of
identity, I hope it will not be the last.
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